Trump❤️Munir: Why & What It Means
When Gen Asim Munir landed in Tehran on Wednesday, armed with an American truce offer, he was following up on the weekend’s 21 hours of direct US-Iran negotiations, held in Islamabad – the most substantive bilateral engagement between Washington and Tehran, since the severing of diplomatic relations, in 1979. That Pakistan provided both a venue and diplomatic channel for this extraordinary encounter, should not come as a total surprise.
A ceasefire deadline falls on April 22, a naval blockade adds to the pressure, and Trump’s art of the deal, circa 2026, appears to be about softening the adversary with a few military punches, before getting the best negotiated agreement. Whether the war ends with a US-Israel ‘final blow’ in Iran by next week, or a peace deal, it’s unlikely to extend beyond month-end, when Trump receives King Charles in Washington. Beyond that, Trump’s calendar is full, as he goes to China in May to seek tactical accommodation, along with a ‘big fat hug’ from Xi. And then, Cuba needs to be conquered.
But for now, Munir is Trump’s chosen channel for the Iran endgame.
Pakistan’s role is driven by an unlikely bond that developed between him and Trump. The origins are instructive. Pak army grew alarmed, when overseas PTI networks lobbied the Trump campaign, to pressure Islamabad on Imran Khan’s release from prison. Response was swift: the engagement of Washington lobbying firms, and the cultivation of bilateral deals spanning cryptocurrency, critical minerals, and counterterrorism cooperation under the CENTCOM framework.
This transactional foundation was reinforced by flattery – nominating Trump for Nobel Peace Prize, and repeatedly crediting him with saving millions in last summer’s India-Pakistan confrontation. Pakistan also advocated for VP Vance to lead the American delegation, amplifying Iranian distrust of the earlier Witkoff- Kushner channel. Pakistan’s civilian leadership was co-opted later, following domestic criticism that PM Shehbaz Sharif remained a bystander.
The cosying up between US presidents and Pakistan’s dictators isn’t new. Ayub Khan endeared himself to Eisenhower, by offering a secret airbase in 1958, and enthusiastically participating in US-led anti-communist blocs like CENTO and SEATO. In 1971, Kissinger chose Karachi to feign a Delhi belly, to land in Beijing instead of Murree, for a deal with the Chinese. Zia ul-Haq served as Washington’s instrument for the Afghan jihad after 1979, and assisted with the Iranian hostage crisis in 1981.
Pakistan maintained Iran’s interest section in Washington until 2015. Munir, now possessed of untrammelled power and an effectively indefinite tenure, operates squarely within this tradition. Pakistan’s role was also shaped by the refusal of other regional players to get involved. Qatar’s trusted mediating function was compromised, when Israeli strikes targeted Doha during talks in 2025. Oman’s Geneva efforts this Feb, similarly, ended with mid-talk strikes. US pulled in Pakistan into this vacuum, supported by an emerging regional quad with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Egypt.
Earlier, the Israeli strikes on Qatar catalysed a Saudi-Pakistan defence pact, a hedge Riyadh required against threats from both Iran and Israel, even as questions mounted about the reliability of the American security umbrella. Elements of Pakistan’s strategic community went further, invoking the Islamic bomb and positing Pakistan as a net security guarantor for the broader Islamic world, a framing that carries serious escalatory risks.
Pakistan’s facilitating role is, however, riddled with tensions that impose real limits on its effectiveness. Israel questions Pakistani intentions. UAE, aggrieved by Islamabad’s engagement with Tehran, has called in outstanding loans, compelling Pakistan to seek emergency support from Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Pakistan’s own relationship with Iran is hardly stable: in Jan 2024, the militant group Jaish-al-Adl conducted cross-border attacks from Pakistani soil; Iran responded with airstrikes in Balochistan; Pakistan retaliated in Iran’s Sistan province – a reminder that none of Pakistan’s neighbours are insulated from the militancy it nurtures.
Pakistan simultaneously serves three global patrons – US, China and Saudi Arabia – each holding conflicting equities in the crisis. Reports that Pakistan served as a conduit for Chinese arms to Iran, and that Chinese satellite intelligence was employed for Gulf target acquisition, sit in direct tension with its positioning as Washington’s trusted interlocutor. Pakistan remains on its 24th IMF programme, hoping that good behaviour will sustain financial support from all three patrons. Whether diplomatic capital converts reliably into assistance is far from assured.
Pakistan’s domestic context is important. Two raging insurgencies, by Baloch and Pashtuns, coalesce in the west with attacks by TTP and serious war with Afghanistan. The most popular political leader remains in jail, public disaffection with the army-led govt is pronounced, and the treasury is drained. In this environment, a high-profile international role serves clear regime interests, projecting national purpose, and providing the military establishment with a legitimising narrative – not unlike the temporary consolidation of support that last summer’s confrontation with India briefly delivered.
A legitimate question to ask is, whether Pakistan’s role as peacenik, will make it pause in the strategy of using terrorism against neighbours, due to the global spotlight, or see it double down on the policy, given global support. But for India, the more pressing consideration is that peace in West Asia bears directly on India’s energy supply chains, its large Gulf diaspora, and its regional connectivity interests. A negotiated settlement advances Indian interests, irrespective of the channel through which it’s achieved. For the present, Indian and Pakistani interests converge on a diplomatic resolution. That convergence is narrow and contingent – but in statecraft, that should be sufficient to support the peace process.
This Article was first published in Times of India.