Munir’s Dangerous Doctrine
A toxic vision for Pakistan has reignited conflict with India
A regressive and incendiary worldview has been unveiled by Pakistan’s de facto ruler, General Asim Munir. It has provoked renewed hostilities with India—and threatens far worse.
On Wednesday, Pakistan’s army escalated hostilities, overriding the civilian leadership’s advice to de-escalate, launching attacks on Indian military positions instead. The decision, made after Pakistan’s floundering defence minister offered an olive branch, highlights how the current crisis has been sparked by one man’s strategic miscalculation. one man’s strategic miscalculation. Late Thursday evening, Pakistan’s attempts to breach Indian defences at various points across the International Border were largely thwarted. Clearly, Islama-bad’s dilemma — to escalate further or seek an off ramp is sharpening.
So why did General Munir, Pakistan’s army chief since 2022, choose this moment to provoke a conflict with India with a terror strike and then recklessly intensify the conflict?
The answer can be traced to a pattern as old as the Republic itself: Pakistan’s army chiefs tend to develop a three-year legacy itch, when the army’s propaganda machine, ISPR, spins dogma into doctrine, conjuring up a vision of the future—often repackaging the past. Mostly, it is a harmless rebranding of a uniformed official as a visionary leader. This time though, the makeover has had dangerous consequences for the world.
Munir had already secured himself an extended term in office without having to go through the trouble of staging a coup. With schoolboyish declamation, he articulated a worldview to select audiences—including overseas Pakistanis—that, while not officially labelled a doctrine, functions unmistakably as one.
Munir’s spring epiphany, however, has less in common with the strategic thought of modern generals and more with a yearning for a mythologised past. Unlike some predecessors who at least gestured toward reform in their later years, Munir has marched the country backward. In recent months, he’s outlined a worldview—shared with select audiences, including overseas Pakistanis—that, while unofficial, functions unmistakably as a doctrine. And it is perilous.
Munir’s spring epiphany has less in common with the strategic thought of modern generals and more with a yearning for a mythologised past. Unlike some predecessors who at least gestured toward reform in their later years, Munir has marched the country backwards.
A Misreading of Jinnah, a Mimicry of Zia
Munir draws from Pakistan’s foundational mythology but twists it. He invokes the two-nation theory—that Hindus and Muslims constitute separate civilizations—but unlike Jinnah, who used it as a political tool within a specific historical context, Munir presents it as absolute truth, despite the idea being tossed in the Bay of Bengal in 1971. He reinterprets Jinnah’s metaphor of Kashmir as Pakistan’s “jugular vein” as divine mandate, sustaining a perpetual confrontation with India.
From Zia-ul-Haq, Munir borrows even more literally. He revives the framework of a mullah-military alliance, an army supported by clerics. Under his doctrine, the military is defend not the borders but the ideological frontiers. His rhetoric is steeped in religious symbolism, and his actions—jailing critics, purging dissent, crushing opposition—mirror Zia’s repressive regime. The fusion of militarism and religious orthodoxy is once again state policy.
From Geo-Economics to Jihadism
Munir has also reversed the tentative shifts toward economic pragmatism pursued by his immediate predecessor. General Bajwa promoted “geo-economics” over geopolitical adventurism, distancing the army from jihadist proxies and seeking regional stability. Even Musharraf, for all his flaws, advocated post-9/11 pragmatism, floated a four-point Kashmir formula, and pursued détente.
Munir has discarded all that. He has reignited ideological hostility and reembraced proxy warfare. The Pulwama attack of 2019 was mounted under his watch as ISI chief. And his sanction of the Pahalgam attack emphasises this shift. What may have been intended as a brief, rallying skirmish with India has now invited severe blowback: the escalating conflict with India, the risks of a full-blown conventional war, and a freeze in the Indus Waters Treaty.
Leading army-watchers did sound the alarm. Military expert Ayesha Siddiqa describes Munir as an Islamist in uniform, while Christine Fair, a scholar of both the military and Lashkar-e-Taiba, compares Munir’s organisation to an insurgent outfit.
Ideology Over Statecraft
At home, Munir’s doctrine serves a clear political purpose: it shores up military dominance amid a deepening polycrisis. Confronted with a failing economy, multiple insurgencies, and a jailed yet wildly popular Imran Khan, Munir has chosen military theatrics over reform. He’s manufacturing external threats to consolidate internal control.
This is not unprecedented. Pakistan’s military has long positioned itself as the guardian of ideology and territory. But Munir’s spin gives that role a theocratic overtone, casting the army as divinely sanctioned. The result: a reckless security establishment pushing the region toward war.
Strategic Folly for Tactical Gain
Strategically, the Munir Doctrine is shortsighted. Its aim—domestic consolidation—comes at enormous international cost. Pakistan is more isolated than ever. Once tolerated for its geopolitical utility, it is now seen globally as a terrorism sponsor. Beijing is cautious. Washington is impatient. The Pahalgam incident only sharpened these perceptions, with the international community recognizing India’s right to respond and urging Pakistan to back down.
A Doctrine of Decay
The Munir Doctrine is dangerous not just for what it proposes but for what it ignores. It offers no economic roadmap, no vision for technological progress, and no aspiration for regional integration. It recycles myths of victimhood, territorial irredentism, and religious nationalism. It emphasises Pakistan’s identity as a wronged Other of India, destined to fight the larger state. This may help Munir tighten his grip, but it imperils Pakistan’s viability as a modern nation-state.
For Pakistan’s long-suffering people, it spells continued stagnation. Munir offers a warped identity politics in place of economic policy, and a theology of warfare instead of diplomacy. His doctrine doesn’t prepare Pakistan for the 21st century—it traps it in the 20th.
Ultimately, the Munir Doctrine is a dead end. It substitutes belligerence for strategic thinking. It indulges the military’s worst instincts. In trying to cast himself as heir to Jinnah and Zia, Munir is embalming a vision of Pakistan that no longer serves its people—and driving it toward becoming a reckless, war-making garrison state.
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This Article was first Published in Times of India.