Munir’s Dangerous Doctrine

Ultimately, the Munir Doctrine is a dead end. It substitutes belligerence for strategic thinking. It indulges the military’s worst instincts. In trying to cast himself as heir to Jinnah and Zia, Munir is embalming a vision of Pakistan that no longer serves its people—and driving it toward becoming a reckless, war-making garrison state.

Sindoor’s New Red Line

Pakistan, by contrast, embraces external involvement. It needs the optics. It declares every Western phone call a validation of its global stature, just as it rebrands military defeats as victories. The Pakistani military’s propaganda wing, ISPR, will undoubtedly package Op Bunyan Ul Marsoos as an unqualified victory —short war, operational brilliance, and international attention.

The same logic was deployed to claim triumph in 1965, 1971, and 1999, each a setback to Pakistan’s army. What really matters is control of the domestic narrative.

As India celebrates Op Sindoor, a robust debate will take place on strategic choices and operational success. Across the border, Pakistan will project its army chief, General Asim Munir, as a victor. He will expect that this limited conflict has bolstered his authority. It plays into long-standing paranoia about India, casting the army as the nation’s sole saviour.

India has now made a doctrinal pivot in its fight against terrorism. India does not need war—or passive restraint. It has delivered a credible, coercive slap against terrorism. But will that prevent the next Pahalgam? Will it make Pakistan rethink the costs of using terrorism as strategy? For India, deterrence is not about spectacle. It has reshaped the adversary’s calculus.

Pulwama

On Valentine’s Day in February 2019, a convoy of buses carrying paramilitary personnel snaked its way from Jammu to Srinagar on National Highway 44. Just short of Lethapora, a little town in Pulwama district, a loud explosion drowned out the quiet hum of the cavalcade. It was 3.15 p.m. A bloodied Kashmir once again became […]

BBC: India and Pakistan are in crisis again – here’s how they de-escalated in the past

Last week’s deadly militant attack in Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir, which claimed 26 civilian lives, has reignited a grim sense of déjà vu for India’s security forces and diplomats. This is familiar ground. In 2016, after 19 Indian soldiers were killed in Uri, India launched “surgical strikes” across the Line of Control – the de facto […]

India’s Multi-Vector Engagement: Can It Include Pakistan?

A major question that arises in this context is whether India can reach tactical understandings, if not strategic resets, with its traditional regional adversaries, China and Pakistan. Both rivalries, at the very least, consume considerable strategic bandwidth and military resources. In the case of the northern neighbour, despite Chinese incursions into the Galwan Valley in 2020 followed by a military stand-off on the Himalayan border, India and China have doggedly continued military and diplomatic conversations to de-escalate the crisis and reach a modus vivendi. This has led to the stirrings of a tactical adjustment, with a Modi – Xi meeting in 2024 and softening positions in 2025.

Book Excerpt: Essays in Mutual Comprehension

Manmohan Singh added poetically that this meeting was ‘an essay in mutual comprehension’ and that the two leaders would together write a new chapter in the history of the two countries. Musharraf presented Singh a painting of the school in Gah village (now in Pakistan), the Indian PM’s birthplace, and where he had had his initial schooling. On his part Singh again recited the Urdu couplets which he had read out to Musharraf in their phone conversation.

12/13 The Parliament Attack

That afternoon, a group of officers from the PM’s security, the SPG, came in to my office. They were convinced that the PM was the primary target of the assault and thanked me for my fortuitous morning intervention. Our obsession in the PMO on ‘no pendency’ had prevented the prime minister’s carcade from crossing paths with the terrorists. Five days later, Home Minister Advani would confirm that ‘the terrorist assault on the very bastion of our democracy was clearly aimed at wiping out the country’s top political leadership.’

Book Excerpt: A Grab at Kashmir

The 1965 war was born of 1962, which left us looking like bumblers…. We foiled Pakistan’s resulting adventure, doubtless an achievement, albeit limited, but it turned Pakistan to other means: fomenting dissidence in our Punjab, feeding subversion elsewhere, developing terror as an instrument of policy, apart from making life difficult in J&K, while scheming its way to nuclear power. All comprehensively demonstrating an undying obsession—doing India down, wresting J&K.

Dealing with Pakistan: India’s Western Neighbour is No Longer a Strategic Priority

India’s Pakistan policy has evolved over the last decade, from an attempted rapprochement in 2014-15, to a focus on stringent border management and counterterrorism. Even though India’s primary strategic challenge over the next decade would emanate from the north i.e. China- the country’s most recalcitrant western neighbour will continue to pose a sub-conventional security threat.