India’s Multi-Vector Engagement: Can It Include Pakistan?
India’s ambition to be a developed economy by 2047 drives it to stabilise its periphery and engage all major global power centres. Can India also arrive at a tactical understanding with Pakistan?
India charts its path toward becoming a major global power and a developed economy in 2047, stabilizing its neighbourhood remains a crucial priority. Equally vital is leveraging international partnerships for trade investment, energy, and technology to drive economic growth. India’s foreign policy has evolved from its earlier stance of non-alignment to a dynamic and pragmatic ‘multi-alignment’ strategy—one that fosters deeper ties with major global players while managing regional challenges.
A major question that arises in this context is whether India can reach tactical understandings, if not strategic resets, with its traditional regional adversaries, China and Pakistan. Both rivalries, at the very least, consume considerable strategic bandwidth and military resources. In the case of the northern neighbour, despite Chinese incursions into the Galwan Valley in 2020 followed by a military stand-off on the Himalayan border, India and China have doggedly continued military and diplomatic conversations to de-escalate the crisis and reach a modus vivendi. This has led to the stirrings of a tactical adjustment, with a Modi – Xi meeting in 2024 and softening positions in 2025.
In contrast, no such model of engagement has been pursued with Pakistan. The absence of incentives on both sides, compounded by strong disincentives, has kept relations strained. While China’s ‘salami-slicing’ encroachments in the Himalayas invoke strategic concerns, Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in Kashmir stirs deep-seated national outrage in India. Consequently, cross-border terrorism remains a formidable obstacle to any meaningful diplomatic engagement. However, given the evolving geopolitical landscape and domestic transformations in both countries, India must continually reassess its approach to its Western neighbour.
Pakistan’s Internal Struggles: A Challenge and an Opportunity
Pakistan, in ‘poly-crisis’ mode since 2021, is navigating a daunting blend of economic, security, and political crises, all reinforcing one another. Currently in the news is Pakistan’s security nightmare. A stark example of this was the hijacking of a train by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) in March, highlighting Paki stan’s deteriorating internal security. Insurgencies from groups such as the BLA, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) continue to pose existential threats, particularly along its western borders. These rebellions, fueled by ethno-national ist and economic grievances, extend beyond Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan to Sindh and even Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK), while the elite Punjabi heartland and remains unable to initiate political negotiations with the moderate elements.
While the infusion of IMF funds has provided temporary economic relief, underlying structural issues remain unresolved. High inflation, unsustainable debt, and dwindling foreign exchange reserves have crippled the economy. These factors drove Pakistan into the grip of yet another IMF program in 2024, with tough conditions that risk wide public disaffection and street protests. In the medium term, since the underlying structural problems have not gone away, Pakistan risks getting into the next IMF program when the current one lapses in 2027. Another economic setback for Paki stan comes from its foreign policy. As its Afghanistan policy backfired and Taliban 2.0 turned against its erstwhile benefactor, Pakistan’s geopolitical rents also dried up, with the US losing interest in a Pakistani conduit to the Taliban. Meanwhile, China’s financial support, once a crucial life. line, has diminished due to disappointing returns on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
Politically, the country remains deeply unstable. With Imran Khan incarcerated and his party, PTI, systematically repressed after the controversial 2024 elections, governance remains weak under an increasingly dominant military establishment. Such instability raises the possibility of internal implosion, a scenario that could have significant repercussions for India.
Paradoxically, Pakistan’s precarious position might incentivize it to seek stability with India. An insecure, financially strained and politically fragile Pakistan may be more inclined towards stabilising relations with India. Economic cooperation, particularly in textiles and pharmaceuticals, could provide Pakistan with much-needed relief and reduce its dependence on a credible commitment by Pakistan to curb cross-border terrorism and dismantle extremist networks operating on its soil. Both countries tend to now see the relationship primarily through a security lens: Pakistan is institutionally paranoid about a dangerous neighbour posing an existential challenge, while India sees a perpetrator of terror.
The Terrorism Conundrum: A Stumbling Block for Engagement
Since 2016, India has adopted a firm policy of refusing formal talks with Pakistan unless cross-border terrorism is addressed. The 2019 revocation of Article 370, which removed Jammu & Kashmir’s special status, further entrenched hostilities, as Pakistan declared it would not engage with India until the move was reversed. These mutual conditions have resulted in a deadlock, marking the longest period—nine years— without formal dialogue between the two nations.
Despite occasional attempts at stabilisation, such as the 2021 ceasefire agreement and the 2024 extension to the Kartarpur Corridor for five years, India remains sceptical. The Pulwama attack of 2019 and subsequent Balakot airstrikes highlighted both the risks of accidental escalation and India’s resolve to develop credible deterrence against proxy warfare. Moreover, repeated ceasefire violations along the Line of Control (LoC) raise doubts about Pakistan’s ability— or willingness—to fully control military dynamics at a time when army chief Asim Munir is grappling with sinking public confidence in his institution. India has signalled that for any diplomatic thaw, Pakistan must show tangible action against terror groups operating within its borders. Although large-scale terror attacks have declined since Pulwama, sporadic assaults in Jammu & Kashmir—including those involving highly trained militants and drone incursions—indicate that the threat persists.
Kashmir Post 370
Since the 2019 revocation of Article 370, particularly after the 2024 general and provincial elections, Jammu & Kashmir has witnessed substantial improvements in law and order. A democratically elected provincial government is expected to further mitigate local grievances, fostering political stability. However, as tourism numbers are projected to surpass the 20 million mark in 2025, concerns remain that terrorist groups may attempt to disrupt the improving situation.
The ’East Pakistan’ Factor
Beyond Pakistan’s internal challenges, India is closely monitoring shifts in South Asia’s geopolitical landscape, particularly the evolving ties between Pakistan and Bangladesh. Historically, Dhaka and Islamabad have had strained relations, but the arrival of Moham med Yunus’s regime in Bangladesh in August 2024 has led to a warming of ties, including military-to-military engagements. While deep-seated historical tensions and prejudices may prevent a full-scale rapprochement, as observers like Ayesha Siddiqa point out, India is wary of potential intelligence collaboration between the two nations, particularly in relation to security threats in India’s northeast.
Multipolar Diplomacy: India’s Strategic Playbook
India has adeptly pursued a multipolar foreign policy, balancing partnerships with the US, EU, Russia, Japan, and ASEAN while countering China’s regional influence. This strategy is most evident in India’s involvement in the Quad, growing defence collaborations with Southeast Asia, and strategic military exports such as the BrahMos missile deal with the Philippines.
For its South Asian home, India’s ‘neighbourhood first’ policy is based on offering asymmetric economic benefits to India’s neighbours in return for assurances of security. The policy comes with a Pakistan-sized hole, so an exception needs to be carved out for the western neighbour. This also puts a regional agenda based on SAARC on hold.
Additionally, India’s ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—traditionally Pakistan’s strong allies—have strengthened significantly. With growing economic linkages and security cooperation, India has gained diplomatic leverage that might influence Paki stan’s future foreign policy calculations.
Confidence-Building Measures: Can Trust Be Restored?
Given the history of diplomatic breakdowns between the countries, trust is a scarce commodity. Grand political gestures in the past have been followed by abrupt outbreaks of hostility. Every decade in the past eight have seen false dawns of political alignments. The Rajiv-Benazir interactions of the late eighties or the Vajpayee-Nawaz Sharif tango of 1999 had aroused much hope of a strategic reset, just as the Manmohan Singh-Musharraf back channel (of 2004-2007) or the more recent Modi-Nawaz Sharif meetings (of 2014 2015) stirred hopes of peace. An approach that eschews grand political leaps but relies on a series of small confidence-building measures may serve the countries best. While political tensions remain high, pragmatism suggests a different approach.
New Delhi did send a signal at the 2024 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit when External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar visited Islamabad, the first by an Indian foreign minister in nine years. India’s message was clear: that India would not be passive but would react positively to any positive moves from Pakistan. But neither side seriously followed through on the initiative, and attacks in Kashmir vitiated the atmosphere anyway.
A pragmatic way forward in 2025 may be a step-by-step approach based on incremental confidence-building measures (CBMs). These could include quiet diplomatic ‘backchannels’, restoration of High Commissioners, resumption of limited trade and cricketing ties and people-to-people engagement through literature, academia, and media collaborations For India, such measures would require Pakistan to demonstrate a genuine shift in its security policies, particularly a decisive end to cross-border infiltration of terrorists.
A Pragmatic Path Forward India’s approach to Pakistan in 2025 is expected to remain cautious, with not enough incentives to seek stabilisation, much less any sweeping reconciliations. Given the persistent threat of cross-border terrorism, India may opt for ‘strategic neglect’ of the Pakistan factor while maintaining select CBMs to prevent escalation. However, should Pakistan signal a serious commitment to curb terrorism, opportunities for incremental cooperation may emerge. Until then, India’s engagement will remain firmly grounded in pragmatism, with national security as its priority.
This article was first published in the April 2025 issue of Cross Section Conversation.